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 THE PENALTIES FOR PIRACY:  
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF NATIONAL PROSECUTION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIME 
By Eugene Kontorovich* 
 
1. Introduction 
The first several years of international efforts against Somali pirates were marked by nations’ 
unwillingness to prosecute suspects, coupled with unsuccessful efforts to establish a one or more centralized 
international piracy courts. In the meantime and with little fanfare, numerous nations have begun prosecuting 
Somali pirates – they have now been tried and convicted in ten nations on four continents. Cases are pending in 
at least seven other nations, with more than 100 defendants in India alone. While anti-piracy patrols continue to 
release over 90% of captured suspects, nonetheless piracy de jure gentium trials have become a worldwide 
effort, and have reached levels unprecedented in modern times. Indeed, in terms of the number of defendants, 
piracy has quickly become the thickest part of the international criminal docket.  
Yet the growth of pirate prosecution presents difficult challenges of its own. While the criminalization 
of piracy by international law is ancient and well-established, there is no international standard for the 
punishment to be imposed. As a result, the sentences imposed in the trials of Somali pirates around the world 
vary greatly. To be sure, one would not normally expect prosecutions of a particular international crime in 
different municipal systems to result in equivalent sentences. Yet with Somali piracy, the parallel proceedings 
in multiple countries involve a common pool or class of offenders, committing often interchangeable offenses 
within a single geopolitical context. A lack of a “minimum of uniformity and coherence in the sentencing of 
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international crimes” for similarly-situated defendants raises basic questions of fairness.1 Some commentators 
argue that such uniformity is even required across different courts prosecuting international crimes.2 Even if 
sharp variances in sentences across different municipal systems are not thought to raise questions of horizontal 
equity, they at least raise the question of the preferable approach to pirate punishment, from the perspective of 
retribution, deterrence and relative severity with other international crimes. 
This Article presents an empirical study of worldwide sentencing for Somali pirates captured and tried 
outside of Somalia. It assembles an original dataset of all Somali pirate sentences by foreign courts, and 
examines the factors affecting the sentencing. Thus it responds to repeated calls for empirical research on 
international criminal law and sentencing.3 The paper contributes the understanding of the legal regime for 
piracy by identifying a previously unappreciated problem of horizontal inequity in multi-national prosecutions 
of Somali defendants. This problem will likely grow as more nations accept Somali pirates for trial. 
Sentencing for international crimes has long been criticized as inconsistent, lax and generally incoherent 
– an “afterthought” to the imperative for prosecution.4 The Article  contributes to the growing empirical 
literature on sentencing for international crimes, which has mostly focused on international tribunals.5 Unlike 
much of the recent work focusing on international tribunals, if finds a significant degree of variance that cannot 
be explained by the characteristics of the offense.6 This is particularly relevant to discussions of implicit 
hierarchies among international crimes.7 Empirical studies of ICTY and ICTRY sentencing discern an implicit 
                                                          
1 Barbora Holá, Alette Smeulers & Catrien Bijleveld, International Sentencing Facts and Figures: Sentencing Practice at the ICTY 
and ICTR, 9 J INT’L CRIM. JUST. 411, 439 (2011); cf. Antonio Cassese, The ICTY: A Living and Vital Reality, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 
585, 596 (2007). 
2 James Meernik, Sentencing Rationales and Judicial Decision Making at the International Criminal Tribunals, 92 SOC. SCI. Q. 588, 
600 (2011). 
3 MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 2-5 (2007); Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The 
Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship, 106 AM. J.. INT’L L. 1, 30 (2012); Ralph Henham, Developing Contextualized 
Rationales for Sentencing in International Criminal Trials: A Plea for Empirical Research, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 757 (2007). 
4 See Drumbl, supra note 3, at 11. 
5 See Shaffer & Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 27. 
6 See e.g., Meerik, supra note 2; Hola et. al., supra note 1. 
7 See Margaret M. deGuzman, Gravity and the Legitimacy of the International Court, 32 FORD. INT’L L. J. 400 (2009); Allison 
Marston Danner, Constructing a Hierarchy of Crimes in International Criminal Law Sentencing, 87 Va. L. Rev. 415 (2001). 
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hierarchy of crimes.8 raises the question of what kind of international crime piracy is – it is more like robbery 
and other “ordinary” crimes,” or more like war crimes, torture and other international offenses. Moreover, the 
evidence about pirate sentencing suggests that there can be an international consensus about the a crime’s 
international illegality without a corresponding consensus on the severity or magnitude of the crime. It also 
suggests that the distributed prosecution of a single international criminal situation across multiple municipal 
courts raises potential problems of inequity to similarly situated defendants. This may be an inevitable 
consequence of a lack of an international tribunal, but it also suggests the challenges of establishing one.  
Part 2 begins by explaining why sentence variance may be particularly problematic in the Somali piracy 
context. Part 3 sketches the history of punishment for piracy. Part 4 gives on overview of global sentencing for 
piracy and introduces the dataset of pirate convictions. Part 5 discusses the average sentences and other 
interesting aspects of the data. Part 6 examines the factors discussed by courts in their sentencing opinions, and 
then uses a multiple regression to see if these factors explain variance across cases. Part 7 turns to the question 
of what appropriate penalties should be based on retributive and deterrent considerations, and Part 8 concludes 
with some implications for anti-piracy policy and international sentencing theory.  
2. The problem of sentences variance 
 
Given that pirate sentencing takes place in multiple separate municipal systems, it bears considering 
whether any non-uniformities should be seen as even potentially problematic. It has been repeatedly noted with 
some concern that the median and mean sentences in the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia are 
considerably lower than in the Rwandan Tribunal.9 The ICTY and ICTR operate under entirely different 
charters; they are as much separate legal universes as two different nations. Moreover, the charter of each 
Tribunal adopts as a sentencing factor the sentencing practice for serious crimes in the domestic Yugoslavia and 
                                                          
8 Kimi L. King and James D. Meernik, Assessing the Impact of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: 
Balancing International and Local Interests While Doing Justice, at 22-25, in THE LEGACY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, BERT SWART, ET AL., EDS. (2011). 
9 See Mark A. Drumbl & Kenneth S. Gallant, Sentencing Policies and Practices in the International Criminal Tribunals, 15 FED. 
SENT’G REP.  140, 142 (2002); Mark B. Harmon & Fergal Gaynor, Ordinary Sentences for Extraordinary Crimes, 5. J. INT’L CRIM. 
JUST. 683 (2007). 
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Rwanda respectively, thus building in some disparity.10 Furthermore, while both charters include the same 
international offenses, the proportion of defendants charged with particular crimes varies considerably, with the 
ICTY having a larger war crimes docket, and the ICTR seeing a much higher proportion of genocide cases, 
generally thought to be more egregious crimes.11 None the less, commentators have suggested that such 
disparate punishment poses problems of equity amongst defendants. The sentencing equity problem is even 
more acute for piracy. 
States that prosecute pirates under international law exercise a jurisdiction shared in common with the 
world. National courts act as agents of the international legal order.12 This is not simply a fanciful turn of phrase, 
but a legal reality. For non-international crimes, countries generally adhere to some version of the multiple 
sovereignties principle, whereby if a single act violates the laws of multiple nations, each one can prosecute 
separately and cumulatively.13 The international double-jeopardy prohibition – non biz in idem – applies to 
piracy and other universal jurisdiction crimes14: 
Robbery on the seas is considered an offence within the criminal jurisdiction of all nations. It is 
against all, and punished by all; and there can be no doubt that the plea of autre fois acquit would 
be good in any civilized State, though resting on a prosecution instituted in the Courts of any 
other civilized State.15 
Thus the major disparities in sentences for Somali pirates can be viewed as if they were variations within the 
courts of a single legal system, for the exact same crime. Thus a group of similarly situated offenders from the 
                                                          
10 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Statute, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993); Statute of 
the International Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994). 
11 Hola, et al., supra note 1. 
12 See Quincy Wright, War Criminals, 39 AM. J. INT’L L. 257, 280, 282 (1945). 
13 See generally Eugene Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: What Piracy Teaches About the Limits of the Alien 
Tort Statute, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 111, 142-44 (2004). If doubled jeopardy barred such multiple prosecutions, defendants could 
seek out the most lenient jurisdiction and get off with a slap on the wrist. See United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 385 (1922). 
14 Lang Report, supra note 2, at 34. 
15 United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. 184, 197 (1820). 
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same nation, engaged in the same course of conduct, and violating the same international law, face significantly 
variable punishment under international law depending on the place of prosecution.  
Jurisdictional arbitrage by capturing states magnifies concerns about cross-forum inequities. Some of the 
pirate prosecutions in the dataset involve defendants that attacked the forum nations’ vessel. Yet the majority of 
convicted Somalis were captured by a vessel of one nationality (typically European or American), and sent for 
trial in the courts of a third nation, usually in the region. For most defendants,  the sentencing forum is not 
determined merely by the accident of capture. Consider a case where pirates were captured by France, but 
transferred for trial to the Seychelles. Such a transfer doubles the defendants’ expected sentence, from an 
average sentence of seven years in French courts, to nearly 15 in the Seychelles. Conversely, when the U.S. 
transfers pirates to Kenya, it greatly reduces their expected sentence, from life in prison to roughly nine years. 
Disparate national sentencing practices mean that such transfers are no longer simply tools of convenience and 
expedience, but measures with substantive and predictable penal implications and consequences.   
This forum shopping is noteworthy because UNCLOS itself only speaks of prosecution by the courts of 
the captor nation. Arguments have been made that UNCLOS does not authorize such transfers, though sate 
practice has clearly taken UNCLOS’s language as permissive.16 As the Lang Report notes, Art. 105 does not 
establish a general universal jurisdiction, but rather one limited to the “jurisdiction of the state that carried out 
the seizure.”17  There is some evidence that captors select place-of-trial fora not just with an eye to geographic 
convenience, but also to the kind of justice and punishment they will receive.18 The existence of sentencing 
disparities suggests that these choices significantly impact defendants. 
                                                          
16 See Eugene Kontorovich, “A Guantanamo on the Sea”: The Difficulties of Prosecuting Pirates and Terrorists, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 
234 , 270-72 (2010); but see Tullio Treves, Piracy, Law of the Sea, and Use of Force: Developments off the Coast of Somalia, 20 EUR. 
J. INT’L L. 399, 402 (2009).  
17 Lang Report, supra note 2, at 22, § 48. However, the Lang Report does go on to praise transfer-for-trial agreements, without 
discussing their compatibility with the limited jurisdictional grounds he had previously mentioned. See id., pg. 25, § 65. 
18 EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE, COMBATING SOMALI PIRACY: THE EU'S NAVAL OPERATION ATALANTA: EVIDENCE, 2009-10, H.L. 
103, at 14 (U.K.) (recording parliamentary testimony of U.K. Minister of State for Africa, Asia and the United Nations that transfer to 
Kenya served deterrent purposes because the “pirates . . . would probably prefer a British prison” to a Kenyan one).  
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To be sure, as with the separate charters of the tribunals, UNCLOS suggests the inevitability of some 
sentencing disparities in piracy prosecutions, by providing that the courts of the capturing state shall “decide” 
on the penalties.19 This does not mean significant disparities are consistent with the policy of UNCLOS. The 
treaty-makers regarded piracy as largely a thing of the past. At most they seem to have been concerned with 
opportunistic or one-off incidents, rather than a new “Age” of piracy. They almost certainly did not contemplate 
a situation where large numbers of defendants engaged in a large-scale piratical enterprise in a given region 
would be prosecuted in dozens of parallel cases in courts around the world. Moreover, the deference to the 
national courts in Art. 105 does not mean that significant observed variance in penalties is not troubling, or that 
courts should not take into account sentencing practices in other nations.   
 3. History of punishment.  
 Piracy is perhaps the oldest international crime. It was the first, and for centuries the only, universal 
jurisdiction offense. Throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, execution was the presumptive international 
punishment. Indeed, the availability of the death penalty was one of piracy law’s salient features. Chancellor 
Kent noted the “severity with which the law had animadverred upon this crime”: pirates are “everywhere 
pursued and punished by death.” International law even allowed for the extrajudicial killing of pirates when 
encountered on the high seas. Naval ships happening upon pirates could treat them as a hostile enemy (thus 
literally hostis humani generis) and immediately resort to lethal force.20 By the 20th century, international 
lawyers came to see killing pirates without a trial as “inconsistent with the spirit of modern jurisprudence.”21 In 
today’s anti-piracy efforts, nations generally apply a law enforcement model, greatly restricting the use of force. 
Similarly, as nations began to narrow or abolish the death penalty, it became impossible to treat it as the 
default punishment for piracy. The United Kingdom, perhaps the world leader in suppressing piracy, abolished 
                                                          
19 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 106, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. 
20 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 71 (1838) (“As therefore he has renounced all the benefits of 
society and government, and has reduced himself to the savage state of nature, by declaring war against all mankind, all mankind must 
declare war against him[.]”). 
21 See Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on Piracy, (1932) 26 AM. J. INT’L L. (Suppl.) 825, 873(disagreeing 
with support for  
summary proceedings expressed in draft report by League of Nations committee of experts). 
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the death penalty for simple piracy in 1837, after the last major wave of piracy had abated.22 The U.S. made 
piracy punishable by death its first criminal code in 1790. The penalty was lowered to life in prison with hard 
labor in 1897, and later the hard labor was dropped.23 The same pattern played out in other Western nations. 
Today, the charters of the ICTY, ICTR and International Criminal Court rule out the death penalty even for the 
most serious international crimes, and thus it would be hard to maintain that international law requires it for 
piracy.24 When piracy was codified in the Law of the Sea Treaty in 1956, appropriate penalties were simply not 
mentioned.25 When piracy seemed a mere hypothetical danger, such omissions would be of no consequence.  
Before the surge in Somali piracy and subsequent international response, there were few if any 
international law prosecutions of piracy.26 But even these scant cases demonstrated the massive variance in 
penalties across countries. China became the world leader in such prosecutions during a crackdown in the late 
1990s and early 2000s. China exemplified the harsh approach to punishment: in a series of four or five cases, it 
imposed the death penalty in two of them, at one point executing 13 pirates.27 These cases appear to be the only 
use of the death penalty for piracy against foreigners under international law in recent decades. While China 
handed down these harsh sentences, India had also launched a then-unusual UJ prosecution of Indonesian 
pirates for taking the Japanese-owned Alondra Rainbow. This case took the opposite approach to China’s, 
sentencing the defendants to seven years in prison.28  
                                                          
22 Britain retained the death penalty for “piracy with violence,” which involves assault or attempted murder, until the total repeal of 
capital punishment in 1998. 
23 See Act of Jan. 15, 1897, ch. 29, 29 Stat. 487 (1897). Hard labor was dropped in 1918, leaving the current mandatory life sentence. 
24 Of course, whether international law allows capital punishment for international crimes is a separate question. 
25 The question of penalties simply did not arise during the years of discussions of the proposed treaty. See Report of the International 
Law Commission to the General Assembly, 11 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 9, U.N. Doc. A/3159, reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. Int’l Law 
Comm’n 253, at 283, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add.l  (“The Commission did not think it necessary to go into details 
concerning the penalties to be imposed and the other measures to be taken by the courts.”). 
26 See Eugene Kontorovich & Steven Art, An Empirical Examination of Universal Jurisdiction for Piracy 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 436 
(2010). 
27 Keyuan Zou, New Developments in the International Law of Piracy, 8 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 323, 342-44, n. 83 (2009) (“In 
comparison with trials in other countries, the punishment imposed by Chinese courts is the most severe.”); see also Zhu Lijiang, The 
Chinese Universal Jurisdiction Clause: How Far Can it Go?, 52 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 85 (2005). In another case, the pirates received 
sentences of 10-15 years. 
28 India Shows the Way in Piracy Battle, ASIA TIMES (Feb. 27, 2003), http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/EB27Df01.html. 
The sentence was ultimately thrown out on appeal. 
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The first international law prosecution of Somali pirates took place in 2006, when the U.S.S. Churchill 
captured a group attacking an Indian bulk carrier. After some discussions, Kenya agreed to try the suspects. The 
defendants received seven-year sentences, which shocked the U.S. ambassador, who wrote in a cable that twice 
that would be a more appropriate punishment.29 Nonetheless, as number of piratical attacks increased, more 
nations sent Somalis to neighboring Kenya for trial.30 When that nation soured on the arrangement, the 
international community turned to the Seychelles, and then other regional states to accept pirates captured by 
multinational forces. At the same time, various European and other nations tentatively stepped into the gap, 
bringing some Somalis back to their courts, particularly in cases where their own ships had been attacked. 
4. The Data 
The available data on international Somali pirate prosecutions cover 30 separate piratical incidents,31 
involving 209 individual defendants and 39 separate sentences.32 (See Table 1, infra.) The time period runs from 
2006, when the first Somali prisoners were brought to a foreign court for trial, to the present, with the vast majority of 
sentences imposed since 2010. The cases come from ten different national jurisdictions outside of Somalia. 
Prosecutions by Somali courts have been excluded for several reasons.33 First, trials in the defendant’s home 
country do not raise the international law issues posed by piracy. The national court is not limited to punished 
piracy on the high seas as a law of nations crime, and thus their sentences are not directly comparable to the 
                                                          
29Kevin J. Kelley, How Kenya Backed Out of Piracy Trials, MARITIMESECURITY.ASIA (Sept. 3, 2011), 
http://maritimesecurity.asia/free-2/piracy-2/how-kenya-backed-out-of-piracy-trials/. 
30EU Nval Force Welcomes Ruling on Piracy in Kenya, HIIRAAN ONLINE (Oct. 1, 2010), 
http://www.hiiraan.com/news2/2010/oct/eu_nval_force_welcomes_ruling_on_piracy_in_kenya.aspx (eleven pirates sentenced to five 
years in prison in fourth Kenyan conviction); Kenyan Piracy Court Sentences Seven Somali Pirates to Five Years in Jail, REPUBLIC OF 
KENYA (Sept. 8, 2010), 
http://republicofkenya.org/2010/09/_kenyan_piracy_court_sentences_seven_somali_pirates_to_five_years_in_jail/ (seven Somali 
pirates sentenced to five years for attacking German vessel); Somali Pirates Sentenced to Five Years in Kenya, BBC NEWS (Sept. 24, 
2010, 9:47 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11407176 (reporting sentence for seven pirates in attack on Maltese-
flagged merchant ship Anny Petrakis); NTVKenya, 8 Pirates Handed 20-year Jail Sentence, YOUTUBE (Mar. 11, 2010), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ej7mkOkLIRs. 
Similarly, Yemen has prosecuted a group of pirates captured by the Russian navy after attacking an Iranian vessel; they faced 5-10 
year terms. 
31 This is not counting additional, prior attacks for which some of the defendants were also charged. 
32Typically, pirate crews are tried and sentenced as a group, with all defendants receiving identical sentences. The difference between 
the number of incidents and sentence arises from a few cases where members of a pirate crew were tried or sentenced separately, and 
differences in culpability or leadership roles is taken into account. Only some nations appear to regard individual sentencing as an 
option. 
33 Convictions by Somali courts represent the vast majority of cases worldwide, with UNDOC reporting over 300 convictions, more 
than double the rest of the world’s amount.  
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foreign cases. International concerns come in when the accused is tried by foreign powers.34 Other reasons for 
excluding Somali cases are technical. There is little information on the details of these cases or on the sentences 
imposed, and there is some question whether prison sentences are actually being served. Similarly, prosecutions 
by other nations, such as Yemen, for maritime robbery within territorial waters are excluded because these are 
not piracy under international law. (A significant number of the Somali cases also seem to be territorial.) As a 
result, the number of convictions for piracy under international law found by this study is significantly lower 
than the numbers reported by UNDOC and widely cited elsewhere.35 
 The data does not differentiate plea bargains from convictions after trial. Moreover, it only reflects the 
original sentenced imposed at the trial level, without regard to subsequent appeals, largely because many cases 
still have pending appeals, and because the availability and nature of appellate review varies across jurisdictions. 
The study focuses on sentencing; so even if a case were subsequently thrown out on appeal, it would be 
included here. Obviously the data should be approached with caution. Two nations account for nearly half the 
convictions, and most countries that have convicted pirates have only done so in one or two cases. International 
prosecution of Somali pirates is still a new phenomenon, and the existing data may not be predictive of future 
trends. There are numerous pending cases in new jurisdictions, which may have more severe most severe.36 Yet 
the sentencing penalties, and in some cases the disparities merit attention before they become more severe or 
entrenched, in case policymakers and courts have any interest in mitigating it. [See next page for Table 1 – 
could not put it here due to formatting issues.] 
                                                          
34 Often pirates are convicted in foreign courts on municipal law charges in addition to piracy on the high seas, or in some cases 
charged with multiple counts of piracy. The numbers here are the total sentence, except for concurrent sentences. 
35 UNDOC counts Omani and Yemeni cases as piracy despite their taking place in territorial waters. 
36 Julia Zappei, Somali Pirates Face Death Sentences in Malaysia, THE JAKARTA GLOBE (Feb. 11, 2011), 
http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/home/somali-pirates-face-death-sentences-in-malaysia/422152; Somali Pirates Could Face 




Table 1 – Somali Pirate Convictions 
Case ID Vessel Name Prosecuting Flag State Sentence # of Ds Max Sent. nviction D
Ned-1 Choizil Netherlands South Africa 5 3 12 Jul-07
Ned-2 Choizil Netherlands South Africa 6 1 12 Jul-07
Ned-3 Choizil Netherlands South Africa 7 1 12 Jul-07
Ned-4 Samanyolu Netherlands Dutch Antilles 5 5 12 May-08
Fr-3 LePonant France France 10 1 Jun-08
Fr-4 "" ""  ""  "" 7 1 "
Fr-5 "" ""  "" 7 1 "
Fr-6 """  "" "" 4 1 "" 
Fr-1 Carre d'As IV France France 8 3 Oct-07
Fr-2 Carre d'As IV France France 5.5 2 Oct-07
Bel-1 Petra/Pompei Belgium Belgium 10 1 30 Sep-07
Esp-1 Alakrana Spain //Span owned 30 2 30 Apr-07
SK-1 Samho Jewelry South Korea Malta/ Kor own 60 1 Apr-07
SK-2 Samho Jewelry South Korea Malta 15 1 Apr-07
SK-3 Samho Jewelry South Korea Malta 13 2 Apr-07
SK-4 Samho Jewelry South Korea Malta 12 1 Apr-07
UAE-1 Arrilah UAE Liberia/UAE ow 25 10 60 Apr-08
Sey-1 Topaz Seychelles Seychelles 10 11 30 Jun-08
Sey-2 Intertuna II Seychelles Seychelles/Span 6 11 30 Oct-08
Sey-3 Galate Seychelles Seychelles/Iran 22 8 30 Nov-08
Sey-4 Talenduic Seychelles France 18 5 30 May-07
Sey-5 Draco Seychelles Seychelles 10 11 30 Sep-07
Sey-6 Gloria Seychelles Seychelles 24 6 30 Jun-07
Sey-7 Faith Seychelles Seychelles 20 10 30 Feb-07
Yem-1 Fishing vessels Yemen Yemen 5 10 60 Oct-06
Yem-2 Fishing vessels Yemen Yemen 12 13 60 Dec-06
Yem-3 "" Yemen Yemen 12 6 60 Jun-06
Yem-4 "" "" "" 5 1 60 Feb-07
Ken-1 Powerful Kenya Panama 20 8 60 Sep-06
Ken-2 Safmarine Asia Kenya Panama 5 11 60 Aug-06
Ken-3 Nepheli Kenya Panama 4.5 7 60 Sep-06
Ken-4 Spessart Kenya Germany 5 7 60 Aug-06
Ken-5 Anny Petrakis Kenya Malta 5 7 60 Aug-06
Ken-6 Pirate mothershKenya n/a 20 11 60 Mar-08
Ken-7 Safina al Bisarat Kenya India 7 10 60 2006
USA-1 Quest United States United States 60 12 60 Sep-07
USA-2 Maersk AlabamaUnited States United States 34 1 60 Jan-07
USA-3 USS Nicholas United States United States 60 5 60 Feb-07




5. Basic Features of Pirate Sentencing 
This section will outline some of the key features of the data. A complete table of pirate sentences can 
be found in Table 1, above. 
• The high and low sentences for similar acts of piracy by Somalis spans the entire spectrum of possible 
jail times, from 4.5 or 5 years in Kenya, Holland, and Yemen, to life in the U.S. and U.A.E.  The data 
reveals a sharp bifurcation between “lenient” European jurisdictions and the U.S. and a few other 
nations. 
• The worldwide mean sentence is 16 years, slightly less on a per defendant basis.37 There is a massive 
variance across sentences. The standard deviation in sentences is 15.2 years, nearly equal to the average 
sentence itself. Excluding the U.S. cases, which are dominated by life sentences, the mean sentence 
drops to 12.6 years, and the standard deviation to 10.8 years. Thus even with U.S. cases to one side, 
there is massive variance in jail terms across nations. 
• The Seychellian (and Korean) mean sentence is close to the global average, which makes sense as that 
country has convicted the most pirates, and applied sentencing norms that seem stricter than Europe but 
less severe than the U.S. The mean penalty in Kenya, the other major piracy forum, on the other hand, is 
nearly half the global average. Similarly, European penalties are (with the exception of Spain) anywhere 
from 1/3 to 2/3 the global average. 
•  The data also show that the choice by capturing states between transfer to Kenya and the Seychelles has 
significant penal consequences. Both countries have concluded enough cases to be able to speak 
somewhat confidently about their sentencing practices. Seychellian sentences are on average 50% longer 
than Kenyan ones. 
                                                          
37 Life sentences are difficult to account for in sentencing studies. Max M. Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller, 
Strategic Judging Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: Positive Political Theory and Evidence, 
23 J.L. ECON. &ORG. 24, 35 n.34 (2007). In this study they have been somewhat arbitrarily converted to a 60 year sentence for data 
purposes, because of the youth of the defendants. See James Meernik, Sentencing Rationales and Judicial Decision Making at the 
International Criminal Tribunals, 92 SOC. SCI. Q. 588, 601 (2011). 
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• The numbers show piracy has quickly become the largest branch of international criminal law. The 
ICTY and ICTR have both sentenced slightly more than 60 defendants (and acquitted 10 each).38 In a 
few years, Kenya and the Seychelles have sentenced almost as many international criminals as each of 
the tribunals in their nearly two decades of operation. This is not to compare the gravity of the offenses 
involved, or the complexity of the proceedings. It does suggest that piracy as an international crime is 
one of unprecedented volume – the international criminal equivalent of street crime - and this volume 
will raise particular challenges that have not been fully address or even conceptualized. 
• Piracy is, on average, punished under international law as severely as some of the gravest international 
crimes. Thus worldwide mean sentence for piracy is equivalent to the average sentence of the ICTY (16 
years), which prosecuted war crimes, ethnic cleansing and other serious international crimes. However, 
worldwide pirate sentences are significantly less than those imposed by the ICTR, because of the latter’s 
extensive use of life sentences.39 The mean pirate sentence internationally also approximates the average 
penalties imposed by the East Timor and Kosovo international tribunals.40 It is also approximately half 
of the International Criminal Court’s presumptive maximum sentence for the “most serious crimes of 
international concern.”41 At the same time, given the variance in sentences, in practice pirates are being 
punished either much more leniently or severely than serious international criminals before international 
tribunals. 
6. Sentencing factors 
 This section will examine the kind of qualitative factors courts have identified as relevant to pirate 
sentencing.42 Two kinds of factors seem to affect sentences; one which varies across countries, and the other 
                                                          
38 Key Figures, ICTY – TPIY, http://www.icty.org/sections/TheCases/KeyFigures (last updated Feb. 3, 2012); Status of Cases, 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA – UNICTR, http://www.unictr.org/Cases/tabid/204/Default.aspx (last visited June 
3, 2012). 
39 Even for non-life terms, the average ICTR sentence is almost 25 years.  
40 Mark A. Drumbl, Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of Mass Atrocity, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 539, 557-58 
(2005). 
41 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Arts. 1, 77 (1998) 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. 
42 The discussion is based on written opinions in cases from the Kenya, Seychelles, Holland, Spain and the United States. Information 
on other jurisdictions is less extensive and comes from news reports.  
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which varies across pirates. First, different nations have different sentencing norms, reflected both in statutory 
sentencing ranges and judicial practices and attitudes in using their discretion within those ranges. Second, 
cases of piracy also vary in their specifics; while all involve a “acts of violence” against another vessel, the level 
and extent of that violence can range from merely speeding towards a targeted ship and attempting to board, to 
firing at it, successfully boarding and taking hostages, or even abusing or injuring the crew or rescuers. There 
are also a variety of sentencing factors that are routinely invoked by pirates, such as their young age, the 
desperate situation in their homeland, and so forth.  
Table 2 – Sentences by Place and Crime Characteristics 
Global 202 4 60 16.80
Europe 22 4 30 8.45
United States 19 30 60 57.05
South Korea 5 13 60 23.20
Somali Region 156 4.5 60 12.88
Level of violence N Min. Sentence Max Sentence Mean
Attempt w/o shots 24 5 20 12.08
Shots fired 87 4.5 60 14.22
Detention 65 4 34 13.15
Assault/injury 11 5 24 15.64
Death 15 13 60 56.00
Hours Aboard N Min. Sentence Max Sentence Mean
0 101 5 20 12.65
1-100 70 12 60 25.43
101-200 19 4 60 11.26
Over 200 12 5 30 10.25
 
Differences in sentencing statutes and policies seem to explain some of the variance across jurisdictions 
(See Table 2). This is clearest in the U.S. example, where a life sentence is both the mandatory minimum and 
maximum sentence. Indeed, while the U.S. has a reputation for relatively strict criminal punishment, life 
sentences are quite uncommon in the federal system,43 and mandatory minimum life sentences for first-time 
                                                          
43 In 2009, for example, only 0.3% of federal defendants sentenced by a judge received life terms. 
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convicts are reserved for aggravated murder.44  Similarly, European countries tend to have significantly lower 
maximum penalties for piracy (for example, 15 years in Germany; 12 in Holland, or 15 when lethal force is 
used; in Italy 14, or 20 for the captain). 
By contrast, Seychellian and Kenyan maximum sentences are 30 years and life, respectively. It bears 
noting that Kenya’s sentences are particularly low in relation to the statutory maximum. And even in nations 
with relatively low maximum sentences, the maximum penalties are generally not imposed. Thus in the 
European and regional prosecutions, prosecutors typically requested much stiffer sentences, and appeal lower 
ones.45 In other words, it does not appear that jurisdictions with higher ranges strive for convergence by 
sentencing at the top of the range, or that those with lower ranges impose the strictest ones they can. This tends 
to reinforce the impression that sentences are almost entirely determined by local sentencing norms, rather than 
punishments in international justice or other prosecutions of Somali pirates in other fora. Indeed, national courts 
explicitly refer to past sentences of Somali pirates in their own jurisdiction as benchmarks. However, they make 
no mention of sentences in other nations, even in universal jurisdiction cases. 
 Despite the disparity in outcomes, national courts take into account similar aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances. Some of these circumstances are quite ordinary. Courts consider the youth of the defendants, 
their status as (presumably) first-time offenders, and the desperate circumstances in Somalia.46 Perhaps the 
biggest variable is the level of violence used. Kenyan and Seychellian courts have treated as aggravating factors 
                                                          
44 Despite the mandatory sentence in the piracy statute, there is nothing mechanistic about these sentences. They cases result from a 
combination of the defendants not pleading guilty, and from a policy decision by the U.S. Attorney to press piracy charges in addition 
to the numerous other indictable counts. 
45 Alice Baghdjian, German Prosecutor Urges Jail in Somali Piracy Trial, REUTERS (Jan. 25, 2012, 6:32 PM), 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/01/25/uk-germany-pirates-idUKTRE80O22U20120125; Somali Pirates Plead Innocence in Paris 
Trial, REUTERS (May 22, 2012, 3:16 PM), http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE84L0AG20120522; Pirates somaliens du 
Carré d’As: appel du parquet de Paris, vers un nouveau procès, L’EXPRESS.FR (May 12, 2011, 4:07 PM), 
http://www.lexpress.fr/actualites/1/societe/pirates-somaliens-du-carre-d-as-appel-du-parquet-de-paris-vers-un-nouveau-
proces_1058123.html. 
46 There has been some discussion of pursuing pirate ringleaders and financiers with greater severity. Sentencing practice in the ICTY 
and ICTR supports the notion that sentence length should be related to the leadership role of the defendant. Given that with the 
exception of one U.S. case, all the defendants in this study have been “foot soldiers” rather than masterminds, there is no reason to 
think that prosecuting states would not impose relatively stiffer sentences for the latter, were they to get them into custody. 
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an exchange of fire, injuries to the crew or vessel, or even the intimidation of the crew. Attacks are said to be 
more serious the further they progress; thus attempts are treated as mitigating. 
 One conceptual question relates to how to treat the abstract gravity of the offense. Pirates could be 
regarded as ordinary robbers that happen to fall within international criminal law because of the location of their 
crime, or as part of a serious threat to international security. Courts have adopted the latter approach. Thus a 
Dutch court noted the steep increase in pirate attacks since 2008, and concluded that “piracy is now a serious 
threat to the internationally acknowledged right to free passage in international waters.”47 Similarly, the 
Seychellian courts have observed in sentencing that “we must not forget that the enormity of the threat that 
piracy poses to maritime enterprise is phenomenal and has the potential to disrupt international law, order and 
maritime security environment at sea, which in turn impacts on the international system of trade.”48 Seychellian 
courts have also spoken of “the adverse effects of this offence on humanity.”  A Kenyan court has said, “Piracy 
in this region has become a menace… this calls for a deterrent sentence.”49 Interestingly, while all these courts 
say they wish to impose a tough deterrent sentence taking into account the broader security implications, the 
actual sentences vary greatly, suggesting one nation’s severity is another’s leniency. 
 Some sentencing considerations relate directly to the exercise of universal jurisdiction. One might 
expect this would be an aggravating factor – universal jurisdiction is thought to be a hallmark of the seriousness 
of an international crime. Interestingly, the courts have treated this as a mitigating factor, because it involves 
incarceration in a country far from one’s home with which one has no previous ties.50 Even in universal 
jurisdiction cases, some fora will have a greater nexus with the crime than others, and this can impact 
sentencing. Thus Seychellian courts specifically take into account, as an aggravating factor, the significant 
                                                          
47 Rb Rotterdam [District Court of Rotterdam], 17 June 2010, NJFS 2010, 230 m.nt. (Neth.) [hereinafter Samanyolu], translation 
available at http://www.unicri.it/maritime_piracy/docs/Netherlands_2010_Crim_No_10_6000_12_09%20Judgment.pdf, at 12. 
48 Republic of Seychelles v. Ahmed, (Criminal Side No. 21 of 2011) [2011] (30 June 2011) (Sey.) [hereinafter Gloria], available at  
http://www.unicri.it/maritime_piracy/docs/Seychelles_2011_Crim_No_21%20(2011)%20Sentence.pdf, at 2. 
49 Republic of Kenya v. Ahmed (2010) (K.C.M.C.) (Kenya) [hereinafter MV Powerful], available at 
http://www.unicri.it/maritime_piracy/docs/Kenya_2010_Crim_No_3486%20(2008)%20Judgment.pdf, at 30. 
50 Samanyolu, supra note 43, at 12; Gloria, supra note 44.  
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impact of Somali piracy on their nation’s economy, which has seen tourism and fishing revenues drop sharply.51 
Perhaps surprisingly for an international criminal charge, Seychellian courts have emphasized that Somali 
piracy “adversely affects our country,” and the judiciary must “play its role” in punishing it with the appropriate 
severity. Again, this underscores that the choice of nation to transfer pirates to has substantive consequences for 
the defendants. 
 While these sentencing factors may explain intra-forum variance (in the few nations with multiple cases), 
they do little to explain cross-national variance. To explore the possible effects of various factors, each 
conviction was coded for three independent binary variables -  success (vs. attempt), use of violence, and 
exercise of universal jurisdiction. The dependent variable is sentence length per defendant, expressed in years. 
Each defendant is an observation. In a multiple regression of these variables, along with nine dummy variables, 
only success is significant (and predictably positive), along with several country dummies. (See Table 3, below 
– significant variables are in bold.) Moreover, the coefficient of success is smaller than any of the significant 
country variables. This suggests that neither the level of violence nor the use of UJ explain the overall variance 
in sentences. Moreover, differential treatment of attempts and successful attacks – a very basic distinction that 
supports the overall validity of the model – does explain some of the variance. However, country effects 
overshadow even the most salient case effects. 
Table 3 – Piracy Sentences, Regression estimates 
    variable |      Coef.   Std. Err.     t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     success |   5.889671   1.249405     4.71   0.000     3.425349    8.353992 
    violence |  -1.865146   1.231557    -1.51   0.132    -4.294265    .5639725 
  Univ. Jurs.|    1.90375   2.425505     0.78   0.433    -2.880308    6.687807 
     France  |  -.2929607   3.786221    -0.08   0.938    -7.760889    7.174968 
                                                          
51 Hon. Mr. J. Duncan Gaswaga, Head of Criminal Div., Supreme Court, Sey., Presentation at the Judicial Learning Exchange 
Program: National Experiences and Challenges in Prosecuting Piracy Cases: Seychelles (Dec. 2011). 
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    Belgium  |   2.707039   6.878375     0.39   0.694    -10.85984    16.27392 
      Spain  |   22.70704   5.167367     4.39   0.000     12.51494    32.89914 
 South Korea |   17.77219   3.876658     4.58   0.000     10.12588    25.41849 
       U.A.E |   17.70704    3.19584     5.54   0.000     11.40358     24.0105 
 Seychelles  |   11.09625   2.425505     4.57   0.000     6.312193    15.88031 
       Yemen |   2.140373   2.732279     0.78   0.434    -3.248764     7.52951 
      Kenya  |   6.434468   2.653636     2.42   0.016     1.200447    11.66849 
      U.S.A. |   52.89572   2.867226    18.45   0.000     47.24041    58.55103 
  N = 209. 
7. Policy Considerations 
 The empirical data does not address the question of what the appropriate penalties should be. Criminal 
punishment serves two primary purposes – retribution (making the punishment fit the crime), and deterrence. 
The unusual circumstances of the Somali piracy prosecutions raise a variety of difficult issues about the 
deterrent effect and retributive justice of various penalties. There are several competing concerns. Low penalties 
may significantly under-deter, and even encourage piracy; on the other hand, high ones may not treat it 
comparably to other international law crimes or its underlying culpability.  
Obviously retributive norms only make sense within the context of some legal system – in comparison 
to other offenses. And retributive norms clearly vary widely across nations. Perhaps a useful benchmark is other 
international law offenses. While it has not been made explicit in treaties, international tribunals have in 
practice created a hierarchy of international crimes by their gravity, from war crimes to genocide. The abstract 
gravity of the crime, as a category, is an important determinant of sentences. It takes away nothing from the 
seriousness of Somali piracy or the suffering of its thousands of victims to suggest that the offense is at the 
bottom of this hierarchy. That is, as a class, the crime is less severe than violations of the Geneva Conventions. 
Moreover, pirate defendants are typically “foot soldiers,” another major factor indicating lower sentences in 
international courts. Yet their sentences are on average comparable to war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
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This suggests that only the “low end” sentences of 5-10 years, and not the average and above average sentences, 
properly reflect the gravity of the offense. 
 Turning to deterrence, even if U.S.-style penalties are unduly harsh from the perspective of culpability, 
the opposite approach creates particular problems of inadequate deterrence. Depending on the forum, it may 
even give rise to the unusual possibility of negative deterrence. Somali pirates come from one of the poorest 
nations on Earth. The reward for the lowliest pirate from a single operation could exceed his non-piratical future 
earnings for his entire life.52 Thus spending several years in a Western prison would not be a significant 
deterrent, particularly with the prospect of release while still young.  On the contrary, the difference in quality 
of life between Somalia and the West means that a prison in the latter is like a palace in the former. Interviews 
with pirates facing trial in the Netherlands find them saying “life is good.” As the attorney for one of pirates 
explained: 
My client feels safe here. His own village is dominated by poverty and sharia but here he has 
good food and can play football and watch television. He thinks the lavatory in his cell is 
fantastic.53 
Similarly, a pirate on trial in Hamburg said he would “not go back to Somalia for a million dollars,” and 
explained that his capture was the best thing that ever happened to him.54 Indeed, pirates on trial in Europe have 
applied for asylum in the prosecuting nation. Thus typical European punishments may in effect be consolation 
prizes for failed pirate attacks. On the other hand, if Western nations applied heavier penalties, they may be 
more reluctant to arrest and prosecute pirates in the first place. The burden of extended responsibility and 
                                                          
52 Indeed, according to some estimates, even when adjusted for the risk of imprisonment or death, pirates earn career incomes 60-70 
times greater than their other opportunities in Somalia. GEOPOLICITY, THE ECONOMICS OF PIRACY: PIRATE RANSOMS & LIVELIHOODS 
OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA, 11–12 (May 2012), available at 
http://www.geopolicity.com/upload/content/pub_1305229189_regular.pdf.. 
53 Bruno Waterfield, Somali Pirates Embrace Capture as Route to Europe, TELEGRAPH (May 19, 2009, 2:30 PM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/piracy/5350183/Somali-pirates-embrace-capture-as-route-to-Europe.html; and the 
Seychelles, in a case not involving universal jurisdiction, imposed a 10-year sentence on a group of pirates that had attempted to seize 
a Seychellian coast guard vessel. Somali Pirates Sentenced to 10 Years in Seychelles, BBC NEWS (July 26, 2010, 12:05 PM), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-10763605. (In another case, the Seychelles imposed a 20-year sentence, but immediately 
released the pirates to Somali custody in what appeared to be a swap for Seychellian fishermen held by the pirate gangs.) 




custody over convicted pirates is one of the reasons for the prevalence of “catch and release.” Thus stiffer 
penalties could result in less net punishment.  
8. Conclusion 
Choices about where to prosecute pirates – be it the courts of the captor, a regional nation that has 
specialized in such cases, or an international tribunal – have significant implications for the kind of sentences 
pirates will receive. While all these fora apply the same law, they do not apply the same penalties. The choice of 
forum has been generally approached based on feasibility and convenience, as a logistical or technical matter. 
The sentencing consideration – the ultimate goal of prosecution – has been largely absent from discussions of 
the optimal modalities for trying pirates.   
 Disparate sentencing for similar crimes raises questions of fairness, especially when the prosecutions are 
self-consciously being conducted as part of an international effort to suppress Somali piracy. The large variance 
in sentences across jurisdictions tends to weaken the deterrent value of such punishment by making it less 
predictable to potential pirates what kind of sanctions they might actual face. However, despite its apparent 
aberrancy, the current chaotic punishment system may be preferable to the alternatives. The lack of 
international criminal sentencing guideline is itself a consequence of the lack of consensus over such secondary 
issues. When a nation undertakes to “domesticate” international crimes, it expects to do so on terms similar to 
how it deals with other offenses. Nations have diverse penal norms, and do not like imposing punishments 
inconsistent with their “scale.” Domestic courts are likely to care as much or more about vertical equity (within 
the national criminal system) than horizontal (international) ones.  
For example, a European nation that has an across-the-board maximum sentence would find it very 
unjust to prosecute a pirate if he faced a life-sentence – such a nation would simply rather not prosecute in the 
first place. Similarly, in the U.S, where non-violent crimes can easily get 15- or 25-year sentences, a five-year 
sentence for pirates would seem unjust, and the nation would prefer not to enforce the international crime rather 
than do so in ways that create domestic inequities. While the United States’ penalties are unusually (but not 
20 
 
uniquely) severe, the legislature’s prerogative to determine separately the punishment for piracy is actually 
cemented in the Constitution itself. 
Another implication of the disparities uncovered here is that there are costs to increasing the number of 
prosecuting states. While doing so obviously spreads costs, it comes at the perhaps inevitable expense of serious 
punitive inequities. For prosecutorial fora, more is not always merrier, especially as cost-spreading could be 
effected through more direct financial mechanisms. the current approach to prosecution in regional states has 
been to enlist as many nations as possible to divide the burden between them. While this has advantages, it may 
come at the expense of sentencing consistency. Thus developing one or two regional states as prosecution 
centers may be preferable than a larger number. Some regional states have already expressed the view that they 
have taken more than their fare share of the burden. Thus an interest in sentencing uniformity might militate for 
greater contributions to those states to offset their disproportionate efforts.  
Finally and most simply, courts should take into account the sentencing practices of parallel fora, 
particularly in universal jurisdiction case. Given the numerous diverse policy-based and equitable factors cited 
in sentencing – the international threat of piracy, its harm to local economies, the ages and alienage of the 
defendants – it would not be anomalous to add some interest in international penalty convergence as sentencing 
factor within the often broad range of the statutory discretion.  
